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OKON AKIBA*

International Law of the Sea: The
Legality of Canadian Seizure of the
Spanish Trawler (Estai)
ABSTRACT
Canada'smarine policy recognizes that the living resources of the
sea are not inexhaustibleand that thefreedom offishing enjoyed on
the high sea by distant waterfishing nations is subject to regulation. Canadahas initiatedregulatorymechanisms to ensure optimal
utilization, maintenance and enhancement of resources through
internationalcooperation, in line with the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the sea (UNCLOS). In particular,
Canadahas been forced to regulate Europeanfishing. Diplomatic
initiativesproved ineffective in securing supportof the European
Union towards curbing excessivefishing effort, and Spanish vessels
continued toflagrantly violate the moratoriathat had been imposed
on 28 species of straddlingstocks, including the highly endangered
species of GreenlandHalibut.Therefore, Canadaamended its Coastal FisheriesProtectionAct in March 1995, permitting enforcement
action against the recalcitrantSpanish trawler, ESTAL While the
EU threatened sanctions against Canada, calling the seizure of
ESTAI an act of piracy and blatant violation of internationallaw,
Canadamaintainedthat unilateralaction was necessary to protect
depletedfish stocks, and to ensure rationalutilization of dwindling
stocks of GreenlandHalibut. This paperexplores the backgroundof
applicable internationallaw and the state of necessity which defines
the fortuitous set of curumstances that could permit conduct prohibited by internationallaw. It concludes that all the particularly
strict conditionsfor a genuine plea of necessity were in existence
when Canadaarrested the Spanish trawler,ESTAI. Itfurther notes,
with emphasis, that measures taken were precautionaryin nature.
They were taken under the pressure of exceptional circumstances,
namely, the grave and imminent dangerwhich foreign overfishing
poses to Canadianessential intereston the Grand Banks.
The fish war that exploded in the spring of 1995, between Canada
Union (EU), effectively focused international diplomatic
European
and the
attention on the environmental consequences of foreign overfishing on the
high seas. Specifically, it directed world moral opinion to the implications
of the reluctance of distant-water fishing fleets, particularly those of

* Professor Akiba teaches Foreign Policy and Multilateralism in the Department of
Political Science at York University, Toronto, Canada.
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Portugal and Spain,' to comply with established measures for ensuring the
conservation and sustainable use of marine living resources on the Grand
Banks.
Since 1977 Canada has been in the forefront of coastal states,
pushing the bounds of international law for the seaward expansion of its
national jurisdiction, in the interest of protecting and managing fishery
resources within and outside its 200-mile exclusive economic zone. Under
the auspices of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO), 2
which was created in accordance with the 1982 United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),3 Canada has sought implementation of
strict decisions on the allocation of straddling fish stocks to foreign fleets.
In opposition to Canadian conservation interests, the European
Union consistently exploited the objection clause4 in NAFO's conventions
to set its own quotas unilaterally in excess of imposed targets.' Moreover,
EU's use of the objection clause specifically violated provisions of UNCLOS
that require the coastal state and distant-water fishing states "to seek, either
directly or through appropriate subregional or regional organizations, to
agree upon the measures necessary for the conservation and development
of such stocks in the adjacent area."6

1. There are roughly 254 vessels fishing in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries off the
coast of Canada. About 149 of these are from the European Community; of which 94 are from
Spain and 44 from Portugal. Spain and Portugal represent roughly 93% of EU vessels; among
foreign fleets, they possess the worst record in overfishing. At the time of the crisis, Ireland
and South Africa had also arrested and detained several Spanish trawlers for alleged
violation of several fishing regulations. See GOV'T OF NEWFOUNDLAND & LABRADOR, ST.
JOHN'S, NEWFOUNDLAND, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON FOREIGN OVERFISHING 1

(1992).

2. For a detailed analysis of the structure, functions, and the role of the Canadian
Government in the Northwest Atlantic Fishery Organization, see B. Applebaum Straddling
Stocks: InternationalLaw and the Northwest Atlantic Problem, in PERSPECIVES ON CANADIAN
MARINE FISHERIES MANAGEMENT, 226 CAN. BULL. FISHERIES & AQUATIC SC. 193-208 (L. S.
Parson & W. H. Lear eds., 1993).
3. UNITED NATIONS CONvENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, OPENED FOR SIGNATURE DEC.
10,1982, reprinted in OFFICIAL TEXT OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE
SEA, at 22, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122, U.N. Sales No. E.83.V.5 (1983) and 21 I.L.M. 1261
(1982) [hereinafter UNCLOS].
4. The objection clause in the NAFO convention releases a participant from the
obligation of strict adherence to allocation decisions.
5. Against its officially allocated quota of 120,000 tons (for the 1986-1991 season),
estimates suggest that the EU netted about 590,000 tons of fish. See Claude Emery,
Overfishing Outside the 200-Mile Limit: Atlantic Coast, CURRENT ISSUE REVIEW, Sept. 13,1994,
at 6 (Canadian Library of Parliament: Political & Social Affairs Div., Ottawa).
6. UNCLOS is weak in this regard because it fails to specify the role or function of the
regional organization in facilitating negotiations. The Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
Organization that was created in accordance with the provisions of the international rule is
often constrained to provide guidance as to alternative actions when participating states fail
to reach mutually acceptable agreements on measures for the conservation and development
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Thus, the mechanisms of regional management proved ineffective
in curbing EU's excessive fishing effort, and Spanish vessels continued to
flagrantly violate the moratoria that had been imposed on 28 species of
straddling stocks, including the highly endangered species of Greenland
Halibut. Canada responded by amending its Coastal Fisheries Protection
Act 7 in March 1995 to permit enforcement action against Spanish and
Portuguese vessels.
The chain of dramatic events that followed Canada's practical
initiatives aimed at enforcing its new regulations are now familiar. The
Spanish trawler Estai, which had been fishing on the Grand Banks under
the protective flag of the European Union, was intercepted on the high seas,
seized and detained in St. John's, Newfoundland by a Canadian naval
destroyer. While the EU threatened sanctions against Canada, calling the
seizure an act of piracy and a blatant violation of international law, Canada
maintained that its unilateral action was necessary to protect depleted fish
stocks, and to ensure rational utilization of dwindling stocks of Greenland
Halibut.
On the heels of all the political maneuvering for fish, our attention
focuses on questions about the legal basis of Canada's unilateral action. Was
the seizure of the foreign trawler justifiable in law? What alternative actions
could have been taken by Canada to safeguard its essential interest? Was
the action limited to what was necessary; to ensure conservation of the
marine environment? These are the questions underlying the European
Union's claim that Canada's amended Coastal Fisheries Protection Act
constitutes an unprecedented jurisdictional claim which lacks justification
in international law. The pivotal issue raised by international legal experts
is whether a state of necessity defense may be used to justify Canada's
action.

of straddling stocks. It lacks the power to enforce regulations on foreign fleets that
commonly exceed their allocated quotas of the total allowable catches. For citation of quoted
section of the convention see UNCLOS, supra note 3, art. 63,
1- 2. For analysis of the
scope and limits of the Law of the Sea Convention see ELLEN HEY ET AL., THE REGULATION OF
DRIFrNET FISHING ON THE HIGH SEAS: LEGAL LsuEs 1-81 (1991) (hereinafter HEY ET AL.) (Food

and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (hereinafter FAO] Legislative Study
No. 47).
7. For the list of amended articles see FIS-ERES ACr. AMENDMEN LIST R.S.C., 1985, ch.
F-14 (1993) (Can.) [hereinafter FISHERIES AcT].

8. The Canadian Government had to release an official response to most of the issues
contended by the EU. See Govt of Canada, Ottawa Tobin And Wells Respond to Misinformation
on the Canada-EUTurbot Dispute, NEWS RELEASE NR-HQ-95-34E, Mar. 27,1995, at 1-5.
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STATE OF NECESSITY: ANATOMY OF LEGAL PROVISIONS AND
JUSTIFICATION OF CANADA'S ACTION
The defense of necessity does exist in international law. The state of
necessity denotes:
The situation of a State whose sole means of safeguarding an
essential interest threatened by a grave and imminent peril is
to adopt conduct not in conformity with what is required of
it by an international obligation to another state.9
The United Nations International Law Commission established
many of the rules or foundation for the defense of necessity. Bearing in
mind the risk of abuse, 0 the legal experts were careful to exclude certain
matters" from the legal terrain on which the state of necessity might be held
to operate. The criteria for establishing a state of necessity that then permits
conduct otherwise prohibited by international obligation are: (1) an
essential interest of the state must be in peril; (2) the peril must be grave and
imminent; (3) the action taken by the state is the only one that could
safeguard its essential interest; (4) the action has not gravely prejudiced the
interest of the state against which the action is directed; (5) the action taken
must be temporary in nature, and limited to what is necessary to face the
peril; (6) the state relying on necessity has not contributed to the particular
state of necessity.
The following analysis shows that under terms of these criteria the
defense of necessity justifies Ottawa's action against the European Union,
in particular the seizure of Spanish trawler Estai.
(1) An essential interest of the state has to be in peril. For a State
to be entitled to invoke the existence of a state of necessity as justification
for a course of action not in conformity with an international obligation, the
specific interests in question must be clearly identified and seen by others
to be genuinely threatened by grave and imminent peril. An essential
interest of a state need not be limited only to the preservation of its very
existence against an external military threat.

9.

Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of its 32nd Session, 2 Y.B. Int'l

L. Comm'n 34, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add.1, pt. 2.
10. The International Law Commission was conscious of the abuse to which the state
of necessity concept might lend itself, particularly for the justification of war, annexation and
such other acts of aggression in breach of territorial integrity and sovereignty. The restrictive
conditions detailed for the admissibility of the defense of necessity are designed to prevent
such abuses. See id. art. 33,
1-2, and commentary.
11. Excluded from the list of conditions sufficient for the plea of necessity are those cited
in the preceding footnote plus treaties concluded between and among countries. For a
documented profile of such treaties, see INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE ESsENTIAL TREATIES AND
OTHER RELEVANT DOCUMENTS (Ingo von Munch & Andreas Buske eds., 1985).
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In the Canadian case under examination, the interests being
threatened by foreign overfishing were both ecological and economic.
Although fishing does not occupy a major niche in Canada's economy,
constituting less than one percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP),"
the fishing industry is imbued with a local significance that amplifies its
economic importance. National employment statistics show that the
industry provides about 50,000 jobs in the coastal provinces. 13 In 1992 fish
export contributed $2.5 billion 4 to annual national income. Moreover,
Canada has been ranked consistently among the top 15 world's largest fish
producers. These economic attributes explain Canadian marine policy that
recognizes fishing as an essential national interest and supports an
investment of about six percent of its entire research budget" on marine
related development. Endowed with the Grand Banks, one of nature's most
productive marine environments, Canada's offshore fishery resource base
supports a growing number of domestic fishing operations and foreign
fleets.
While Canada's fisheries offer enormous economic opportunities,
foreign overfishing poses equally daunting challenges to Canadian fishery
managers. For example, increased foreign fishing pressure outside the 200mile limit contributes to severe depletion of fish stocks in domestic waters,
including the key Atlantic fish stocks of cod, flounder, flatfish, redfish, and
Greenland Halibut. In the last two decades such fish stocks have all
experienced roughly 50 percent decline" in their total abundance. This
ecological malaise has caused deepening economic and social problems in
the fisheries industry: sharp reductions in catch allocations to sectors of the
domestic Canadian fleet, overcapacity in the corporate sector, vessel tie-ups,
and unemployment particularly in East Coast provinces where access to
alternative means of subsistence is particularly limited. 7

12. See Statistics Canada, Gross Domestic Product at Factor Cost by Industry, at 1986
Prices, System of National Accounts, July 1995, at 10, tbl. 1.
13. See Statistics Canada, Labor Force and Employment by Detailed Industry and Sex,
System of National Accounts, Aug. 1995, at B-24, tbl. 9.
14. Statistics Canada, Fish Exports Value by Commodity Groupings, System Of
National Accounts, Dec. 1992, at 16, tbl. 3; see also Dep't of Fisheries And Oceans, Canada's
Oceans 13-15 (1987).
15. See Peter Meyboom, Canada'sOcean Policy, in OCEAN POLICY IN THE 1990s 92 (1990).
16. See Emery, supra note 5, at 7; see also Oceans Institute of Canada, Managing Fishery
Resources Beyond 200-Miles: Options To Protect Northwest Atlantic Straddling Stocks 15
(1990).
17. The social and economic consequences of these problems are discussed in WILUAM
E. SHRANK ET AL., The Cost to Government of Maintaininga Commercially UnviableFishery:The
Case ofNewfoundland 1981/82 to 1990/91, 26 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.357, 358- 65 (1995); SILVER
D. CAMERON, Net Losses: The Sorry State of Our Atlantic Fisheries,CANADIAN GEOGRAPHIC,
Apr./May 1990, at 29-37.
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Responding to this crisis, the government committed about $1.9
billion" towards relieving roughly 40,000'9 dislocated fishers. The size of
this emergency social rescue package indicates the scale of the problem
affecting Canadian economic interests. It also constitutes a drain in
government financial resources that could have been invested to foster
economic progress elsewhere in the Canadian economy.
Growing unemployment, together with deepening social
restiveness, and the extra burden of the emergency rescue program on
government budget, should serve as sufficient evidence that an essential
economic interest of the State was in such peril that the Canadian
Government was forced to adopt unilateral measures for dealing with
intransigent foreign trawlers. Canada did not have to establish a proprietary
right to the Greenland Halibut stocks, or other straddling fish stocks, in
order to invoke the state of necessity. The paramount concern was the
protection and enhancement of fish stocks, upon which the economic
survival of coastal populations hinged.
(2) The peril must be grave and imminent. During the crisis in
question, Fishery Minister Brian Tobin's central message to the EU and the
United Nations was that, in the absence of collective regional cooperation
in limiting the catch of the endangered Greenland Halibut, the species
would soon be extinct.
A 1995 study by the Food and Agricultural Organization of the
United Nations (FAQ) found that the trend towards commercial extinction
of major Canadian fisheries was largely attributable to the "unregulated
nature of high sea fisheries" 2 and the ecologically destructive effects of
distant-water fishing nations. This study complements the report by the
Scientific Council of NAFO,n which links the impact of excessive foreign
fishing to the rapid rate of decline in the biomass of Greenland Halibut fish
stocks, from 70,000 tons (1991) to 20,000 tons (1994). The total biomass of
Greenland Halibut of spawning age also declined precipitously from 16,000

18. Gov't of Canada, Ottawa, The Fisheries Crisis in the Northwest Atlantic, News
Release B-HQ-94-19, June 1994, at 2.
19. The number of unemployed persons has been on the rise since 1988. See Brian Tobin,
Speaking for the Fish, 20 FISHERIES 18 (1995).

20. Food & Agricultural Organization of the United Nations [FAO], The State of World
Fisheries & Aquaculture, 42 (1995).
21. For commentaries on the extent of the decline in the total abundance of various fish
stocks, contribution of the EU to the growing problem, and prospects for regenerating fish
stocks under moratoria, see Dep't of Fisheries and Oceans of Canada, Ottawa, Why NAFO
Members Agreed upon a Total Allowable Catch for Greenland Halibut, Backgrounder B-HQ95-3E, Mar. 1995, at 1; see also Dep't of Fisheries and Oceans of Canada, Ottawa, European
Union Overfishing in the Northwest Atlantic, Backgrounder B-HQ-95-4E, Mar. 1995, at 1.
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tons (1991) to 2000 tons (1994).2 Figure 1 graphically confirms the direct
contribution of the EU to the growing malaise of dwindling fish stocks.
Between 1986-1987 the EU took roughly eight times more fish than was
allocated to it by NAFO. Figure 2 shows that between 1986-1992 EU fleets
reported catches of cod, redfish, and flounder to be three times greater than
their NAFO quotas. A comparison of the volume of Greenland Halibut
stocks taken inside and outside the Canadian 200-mile fishing zone is selfexplanatory (Figures 3 and 4). Despite strict conservation measures, catches
of the Greenland Halibut stocks by foreign fishers outside the 200-mile zone
is on the rise, from less than 5,000 tons (1987), to 50,000 tons of fish in 1993.
In the zone under Canadian control, the trend has been in the opposite
direction, from roughly 30,000 tons (1987) to slightly more than 5,000 tons
(1993). This trend is more in line with NAFO reductions in quota allocations
for conservation purposes.
The downward trend in fish abundance, which is strongly related
to foreign overfishing, supports Fisheries Minister Brian Tobin's position
that uncontrolled exploitation would lead ultimately to the total extinction
of Greenland Halibut stocks. In this context, it was necessary for Canada to
act on behalf of its interest, to protect an endangered source of world food.
Not to do so would result in the destruction of the fisheries as a way of
living, not just for Canadians but for Europeans and the world community
as well. This was also the central theme in Premier Clyde Wells' address to
the Royal Institute of International Affairs at Brussels. In his address the
Premier of Newfoundland reflected on the experiences of the past, in
particular the failure of the Canadian Government to regulate and control
fishing effort. Wells concluded that Canada has the obligation to conserve
what remains of the fisheries, otherwise, "the world will lay the blame for
the destruction of the resource squarely on the country's doorstep."24

22. Following this, a total allowable catch of 27,000 tons was adopted by NAFO,
representing a reduction of more than 50% from catches of about 60,000 tons in 1992-1994.
See Gov't of Canada, Ottawa CanadaWns Critical Vote on Turbot at NAFO, NEW RELEASE NRHQ-95-10E, Feb. 2,1995, at 1.
23. History tells us that the collapse of certain important Canadian fisheries was due
largely to overfishing by foreign fleets: species of lake sturgeon, Grand Banks haddock,
Georges Bank herring, and more recently, the northern cod, are a few examples.
24. See Premier Clyde Wells, Canadais Right to Act to Protectthe Turbot Stocks, GLOBE &
MAIL, Mar. 13, 1995, at A22; see also Premier Clyde Wells, Address at the Royal Institutefor
InternationalAffairs (Apr. 28,1992).
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Figure 1 EU NAFO Quotas and Reported Catches of NAFO Managed Groundfish
Stocks, adapted with modications from NAFO Statistical Bulletins (1985-1993).
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Figure 2 EU Fleets Reported Catches 3 Times Greater than their NAFO Quotas
(1986-92), adapted with modifications from NAFO Statistical Bulletins (19851993).
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Figure 3 Catches of Greenland Halibut outside the Canadian 200 miles fishing
zone, adapted with modifications from NAFO Statistical Bulletins (1979-1993).
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Figure 4 Catches of Greenland Halibut inside the Canadian 200 mile fishing zone,
adapted with modifications from NAFO Statistical Bulletins (1979-1993).
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In these words, we hear echoes of sustainable development' which
informs the precautionary ecological principle elaborated in the Stockholm 2
and Rio Declarations, and was embodied in the United Nations
Conference Chairman's Draft Convention on Straddling Stocks and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks. 28 Aside from the legal provisions of the state of
necessity, Canada's action against the defaulting Estai may also be justified
by the emergent, and more radical, precautionary principle which
encourages coastal states to take pre-emptive action where there is a
perceived risk of severe and irreversible damage to resources.'
(3) The action taken by the state is the only one that could
safeguard its essential interest.

Having established that the ecological peril was grave and
imminent, the question remains whether the means used by Ottawa were
the only ones available in the circumstance. This requires proof that Canada
had fully explored all alternative diplomatic avenues of resolving the hotly
contested issue before arresting the defiant vessel Estai.

25. Sustainable development has been defined as "development that meets the needs
of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
needs." See WORLD CommimION ON ENvIRoNMENT & DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTuRE 43
(1987). Nevertheless, long before this notion of sustainable development became fashionable
through the works of the World Commission on Environment and Development, the Haidi
First Nation of Canada's Pacific Coast was the first to remind us that "we do not inherit the
land from our forefathers, we borrow it from our children." See Videotape: Indigenous
People (Gov't of Canada: Fed. Ministry of Information 1967) (on file with the Toronto Public
Library).
26. Report of the United Nations Conference on Human Environment, Stockholm, 5-16 June,
1972, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (1973).
27. Report ofthe United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro,
June 3 -14, 1992, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26, Vol. 11 (1992); see also 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992).
28. United Nations Conference on StraddlingFish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks:
A Guide to the Issues before the Conference Preparedby the Chairman,U.N. Doc. A/CONF.164/10
(1993).
29. In other words, nations are encouraged to become constructive 'warriors' in the
struggle to protect the environment. A more radical strand of the precautionary principle
requires nations to take pre-emptive action, even in the absence of certainty about the impact
or the causal relationships between human action and the environment. See Andre Tahindro,
Conservationand Managementof TransboundaryFish Stocks: Comments in Light of the Adoption
of the 1995 Agreementfor the Conservation and Management of StraddlingFish Stocks and Highly
MigratoryFish Stocks, 28 OcEAN DEv. & IN*'L L. 1,12-15 (1997); FAQ, supranote 20, at 10.
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Ottawa initiated diplomatic ° measures to achieve a mutually
peaceful solution to the problem. Information derived from diplomatic
letters confirms that following sharp EU disagreement with NAFO decision
to limit its quota of turbot catch to 3,400 tons (representing only 12 percent
of 1994 catches), Canada convened an emergency meeting aimed at
resolving the problem as early as March 1995, in Vancouver. However,
negotiations during the early sessions involved inflammatory exchanges
between the EU and Canadian representatives with little progress towards
compromise. While the Canadian proposal for a 60-day moratorium on
fishing for Greenland Halibut was rejected by the EU Secretariat, Spanish
trawlers that had temporarily fled from the Grand Banks on the eve of the
announcement of the new enforcement legislation returned in full force to
fish. Information revealed Spanish catches to be in excess of NAFO
allocated quotas.' 1
Spain's provocation at sea, exacerbated by EU's initial reluctance32
to endorse NAFO's revised proposals on new fish quota allocations,
convinced the Canadian government that it was necessary to play the
military card. Although the general rule of international law frowns on
military actions, the steady shift in world opinion towards stricter
environmental enforcement policy supported strong measures. For
example, the governments of Ireland and South Africa had contemplated
legally banning Spanish fleets from their waters.3
Nevertheless, the decision to arrest the Estai was taken after due
concern for political consequences of such an action. Ottawa had been
concerned that an act of coercion on the high seas could risk Canada's
international image of benign peace broker. The government was also

30. Initial diplomatic initiatives did not receive the publicity that was lavished on the
more dramatic events that surrounded the seizure of Estai. For highlights of the spate of
diplomatic moves preceding the aggressive intervention, see Atlantic Fish: Battle Stations, THE
ECONOMIST, Mar. 18,1995, at 46-48; Jeff Sallot, Diplomacy Prevailsas CanadianWarships Sail
Toward Confrontationwith Spain, GLOBE &MAIL, Apr. 17, 1995, at A2, A4; Gov't of Canada,
Ottawa, Chronicle of Key Events: Canada-EUTurbot Dispute, BACKGROUNDER B-HQ-95-11E,
Apr. 1995, at 1- 5.
31. See Kevin Cox, Many Boats Break FishingRules, GLOBE &MAIL, March 17,1995, at Al;
Cox, CanadaUnable to Stop ForeignFishingof Turbot, Gi OBE & MAL, Feb. 24,1995, at A3; Gov't
of Canada, Ottawa Tobin Says CanadaWill Not Let the EU DevastateTurbot, NEW RELEASE NRHQ-95-21-E, Feb. 15,1995, at 1.
32. The EU had been very critical of NAFO, protesting that the organization has become
a front for Canada's manipulation to increase its control over the allocation of stocks in its
favor. Calling Canada's conservation measure a hoax, an attempt to "create a heaven for fish,
and hell for European fishing populations," the EU decided to set up an autonomous quota.
See Emery, supra note 5, at 6.
33. See Jeff Sellot & Madelaine Drohan, Searchfor Face-saving Deal May Bring End to
Turbot Battle, GLOBE & MAIL, Apr. 12, 1995, at A10.
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aware that such an action could set a precedent for countries with less
prudent intentions than conservation. However, after balancing probable
political costs with the environmental consequences of inaction, the
government of Canada concluded that force was the indispensable means
of ensuring the preservation of Canadian threatened essential interests.
(4) The action taken is not discriminatory or gravely prejudiced.
The matter of prejudice might have been resolved through litigation. The
Spanish Government had filed a case against Canada in the International
Court of Justice at the Hague.3' However, in response to the emergency
situation in the fisheries sector, Canada had amended its acceptance of the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, precluding any challenge on its
authority to enforce new regulations on the protection of straddling stocks.
Since the Court can adjudicate on an action only when all parties to a
dispute agree to submit their differences for consideration, legal decision of
the World Court on this case may never be available on record.
If Canada had submitted to the Court's jurisdiction, the Court
would have been required, in making a ruling, to balance the prejudice
Canada caused to Spain in acting against the Estai, against the benefit that
Canada and the international community would reap from the protection
of endangered fish stocks. Secondly, the general rule of international law on
the exploitation of shared natural resources does not require proof that both
parties' interests have been affected. The European Union would not have
been required to prove that Canada had breached its duty to the EU. 3s
Rather, the law assumes that the State adopting a unilateral action to protect
its marine living resources has been affected. Thus, the burden of proof
would be on Canada to show why its action should not be considered
discriminatory.
Officials of the fisheries ministry have publicly' argued that the
prejudice that Canada and the international community would otherwise
have suffered, in permitting the depletion of turbot fish stocks, far outweigh
the cost of Canada's conduct in breach of obligation owed to Spain and the
EU. Citing European fishery management record,37 which confirms that
EU's poor management has led to the commercial extinction, sometimes
total extinction, of several species, Canada argued that stiff measures

34. See Justice for All from a Global Courtroom, THE LAWYER, Mar. 19, 1996, at 9; Spain
Brings a CaseAgainst Canada,I.C.J., Communique No. 95/8, March 29,1995; Paul Koring and
Brian Milner, ProgressMade in Fish Talks, GLOBE & MAIL, Mar. 29,1995, at Al.
35. For comments on this legal issue see, HEY ET AL., supra note 6, at 9.
36. Dep't of Fisheries and Oceans of Canada, Ottawa, The InternationalConsensus on
Conserationof Fish Stocks, BACKGROUNDER B-HQ-95-2E Apr. 2,1995, at 1.
37. For EU-documented evidence of the organization's failures in the management of
fisheries, see COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, REPORT ON THE MONITORING
IMPL.EMENTATION OF THE COMMON FISHERIES POLIcY, 11 - 17(1992).

Fall 1997]

INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA

against foreign fleets were necessary to prevent a duplication of the
European experience in the Northwest Atlantic.
(5) The action taken is temporary in nature and limited to what
is strictly necessary to face the peril. Canada's action was a temporary one.
For example, the statement of purpose in the amended portion of the
Fisheries Protection Act, aims at enabling "Canada to take action necessary
to prevent further destruction of straddling stocks and to permit their
rebuilding, while continuing to seek international solutions," ' (emphasis
added). However, for some critics the emphasis on attempts to conclude
further agreements with distant-water fishing nations was not persuasive
evidence of limited means. Sections of the British House of Lords, and
diplomats elsewhere, at Brussels, were concerned that the Parliamentary
Act, under which the amendments were articulated, gave the new fishery
measures a sense of permanency. Reiterating his government's commitment
to a negotiated settlement of the question of foreign participation in the
Greenland Halibut fisheries, Minister Brian Tobin sought to reassure the
world community at the United Nations on March 24, that the legislation
was adopted as a temporary measure solely to deal with an emergency
situation; and, that "Canada takes no pride in being forced to come to the
conclusion that unilateral action is required to end the problem of foreign
overfishing." Ultimately, Canada was successful in securing an interim
agreement limiting, but not excluding, the EU from further participation in
the Grand Banks fisheries. The negotiated settlement confirms that the
action taken against the Estai was temporary, and that Ottawa was flexible
as to the means of achieving the goal40 of rational fisheries management.
At a different level, the question remains whether or not the
conduct in question was limited to what was strictly necessary for the
purpose? Some have answered in the negative, concluding that it was
wrongful of Canada to have subjected the captain of the Spanish vessel to
criminal charges,4' and imposing heavy fines on him and the boat. The

38. See Minister of Fisheries Brian Tobin, Remarks to Parliament on the Coastal Fisheries
Protection Act 3 (May 10, 1994) (transcript available in Fisheries and Oceans of Canada
Resource Library).
39. Minister of Fisheries Brian Tobin, Remarks at the Conference of the United Nations
on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks 9 (Mar. 27, 1995) (transcript
available in Fisheries and Oceans of Canada Resource Library); see also Govt of Canada,
Ottawa, Tobin Will Lead CanadianDelegation to U.N. Conference, NEWs RELEASE NR-HQ-94-91E,
Aug. 12, 1994, at 30.
40. See Gov't of Canada, Ottawa, Canada-EUReach Agreement to Conserve and Protect
Straddling Stocks, NEWS RELEASE NR-HQ-95-36E, Apr. 15,1994, at 1 - 2.
41. At the domestic court in St. John's, the arrested crew was accused of "plundering
the last of halibut stocks"; specific charges against the captain included overfishing with
illegal gear, under-reporting of catches, and excessive harvesting of juvenile fish. See Gov't
of Canada, Ottawa, CanadaSeizes Spanish Trawler,NEWS RELEASE NR-HQ-95-29E, Mar. 9 1995,
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punishment stems from Canada's unilateral extension of domestic law to
international waters. In Canada, fishery regulations have the status of
criminal law.42 Under the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, violators are
subject to fines of up to $750,000, and possible forfeiture of their vessel,
fishing gear and catch. These are the legal elements in Canada's domestic
fisheries management regime, which were extended beyond the 200-mile
limit during the emergency. Equally, the legal authority granted to coastal
states (Canada) in international law "to take such measures, including
boarding, inspection, arrest, and judicial proceedings as may be necessary
to ensure compliance with the laws and regulation adopted [in the exclusive
economic zone],"' were also extended beyond Canada's exclusive
economic zone.
Under the circumstance of emergency, the actions taken were
relatively mild. For example, the law was not applied in full measure, as the
captain was released after posting bail for $8,000. While the Estai was
released on a $500,000 bond, no charges were laid against the crew." Even
at the height of the controversy, the government of Canada continued to
reassure the international community that Ottawa's relations with the EU
would not suffer any permanent damage.
(6) The state in question (Canada) has not contributed to the
prevailing state of necessity. In more specific terms, the majority opinion
among legal experts of the International Law Commission is that "a state
claiming the benefit of the existence of a state of necessity must not itself
have provoked, either deliberately or by negligence, the occurrence of the
state of necessity."*
Canada's past history reflects an absence of regulatory vigor.
Between 1945-1977, government marine policy shifted steadily towards the
development of a strong corporate sector for offshore fishing. Against the
background of steady advances in electronic fishing technology,
government's failure to control expansion of corporate operations
contributed to the pressure which was driving the mortality of fish stocks
beyond their capacity to replenish and regenerate. The collapse of Northern

at 30; see also Gov't of Canada, Ottawa, Spanish Captain Released on Bail, NEWS RELEASE NRNF-95-22E, Mar. 12,1995, at 30.
42. See FISHIESACr, supra note 7, §§ 78-86. For analysis of the Fisheries Act, see R.W.
Crowley & H. Palsson, Rights-Based FisheriesManagement In Canada, 7 MARINE RESOURCE

EcON. 1, 1-4(1992).
43. International law prohibits imprisonment or prolonged detention of the captain and
crew of an arrested foreign vessel. See UNCLOS, supra note 3, art. 73, 1 2-4. None of these
laws were impugned by the action in question.
44. For an account of the events leading up to the release of the Estai and its crew, see
Spanish Captain Released on Bail, supra note 41.
45. See Y.B. INT'L L. CoMM'N, supra note 9, 34.
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cod and West Coast salmon fisheries, including the commercial extinction
of several key Atlantic species of flounder, haddock and swordfish, are
manifestations of negligent home-based fishing practices. The divisive race
for fish by foreign distant-water fleets could be seen as an exacerbation of
these domestic practices.4
On the surface, given its past record, Canada would be disqualified
from applying the plea of necessity. Nevertheless, fresh debates on the contribution of a State to the state of necessity indicate a narrowing of doctrinal
differences on the legal condition in question, producing modifications47 in
law which permit a state with past record of negligence in the management
of fisheries to rely on the defense of necessity. According to this view, a
State's contribution to the occurrence of the state of necessity would have
to be deliberate or intentional for it to be precluded from relying on the
defense of necessity. Additionally, since the above-mentioned restrictive
condition coexists with other relevant requirements of equal importance, a
state with proven good record in current fisheries management may not be
precluded from the benefits of the defense of necessity.
Applied to the case under examination, few would doubt that
Ottawa has been a frontrunner in recent efforts towards the conservation of
ocean resources. From 1977 onwards, Canada's initiative in NAFO towards
strengthening existing international law, diplomatic and public information
campaigns, tough conservation decisions, and the strict enforcement of
regulatory measures against defaulting domestic vesselss are clear indica-

46. Contesting the contribution of foreign overfishing to this problem, the legal
department of the EU Secretariat produced a document showing that in the last five years
there has been an 80%decline in groundfish stocks located entirely within Canadian waters;
and that this situation has been due mainly to the destructive fishing practices of Canadian
fishers. See Sir Leon Brittan, Memo to Clyde Wells: 'Canada Has Broken All the Laws of the Sea',
BULL. EuR. UNION, March 15,1995 (Commission of the European Communities, Brussels).
36-37. Competing viewpoints have also
47. Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, supra note 9,
provided brief and useful insights. Jose A. de Ytuffraga, Canada'sPresencialSea "De Facto",
6 LAW OF THE SEA LIEDER, Apr. 1995, at 1-2 (Law of the Sea Inst., William Richardson School
of Law, U. of Haw.); J.Alan Beesey & Malcome Rowe, A ConseruationDispute,supra at 1-3.
48. The following high seas fishers came under strict Canadian legal scrutiny in 1994
alone: Canadian vessel Stephen B was arrested for fishing tuna off the coast of Bermuda; one
month later, a Panamanian registered vessel, Kristina Logos, was also apprehended and
charged with several violations including the use of illegal mesh gear. The captain of each
of the vessels was indicted in accordance with Canadian law. While Washington was still
expressing displeasure over the seizure (January 21) of two American scallop boats outside
Canada's 200-mile limit, about 300 American salmon boats were arrested (March 2) and
forced to pay $1,500 in license fees. They Were also charged with depleting Canadian stocks.
In effect, without prejudice against Spain, Canada has been even-handed in punishing all
defaulting fishers. For a general discussion of practical problems in government enforcement
measures see A. Bruce Arai, Policy and Practicein the Atlantic Fisheries:Problems of Regulatory
Enforcement, 20 CANADIAN PUB. POL'Y 353, 354-64 (1994).
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tions of a rising national conservationist consciousness. They may also be
seen as acts of atonement for the legacies of past fisheries mismanagement.
The arrest of the Estai was borne out of necessity. The action may
also be seen in political terms. In this view the action against the Spanish
vessel, in breach of the rules of international law, was aimed at pressuring
the United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks to accelerate ongoing negotiations for reforms in
fishery practices; to focus world attention on the urgency of recognizing
coastal states' proprietary right to manage those fish stocks facing extinction
in adjacent waters.
CONCLUSION
The arguments in this paper indicate that all the particularly strict
conditions for a genuine plea of necessity were in existence when Canada
arrested the Spanish vessel Estai. Justifying this action in law, our emphasis
is on the precautionary nature of measures, which were taken under
pressure of exceptional circumstances. The grave and imminent threat
which overfishing by recalcitrant distant-water fishing nations poses to
Canadian essential interest on the Grand Banks justifies the action. All
coastal states have the responsibility in law to take such action to protect not
only their interests, but also the rights of the international community to
marine living resources in adjacent waters.
Further justification for Canada's unilateral49 action may be found
in a few precedents' ° which include the case of Fur Seal fisheries off the

49. Prime Minister Trudeau's unilateral declaration of the 1970 Arctic Water PollutionAct
(later recognized by UNCLOS and codified in article 234) is relevant. In adopting this
unilateral measure, the government of Canada had to reconcile two apparently conflicting
national interests: commitment to the principle of international law on the freedom of high
sea navigation/shipping, and the need for stringent measures towards protecting its marine
environment (essential national interest) against ship-generated pollution. For codification
of this Canadian law into international law, see UNCLOS, supra note 3, art. 234. For
commentaries on the legal implications of article 234, see McRea et al., Environmental
Jurisdictionin Arctic Waters: The Extent of Article 234, 16 U. B.C. L. REV. 22, 30-31 (1982);
Gerald R.Ottenheimer, PatternsofDevelopment in InternationalFishery Law, Xl CAN. Y.B. INT'L
L. 37,42 (1973).

50. The U.S. Truman Proclamation (1945), is also a relevant precedent for justifying
Canada's action. With respect to coastal fisheries in certain areas of the high seas, it reads
thus:
In view of the pressingneed for conservation and protection offishery resources,
the Government of the United States regards it as proper to establish
conservation zones in those areas of the high seas contiguous to the coasts
of the United States wherein fishing activities have been or in the future
may be developed and maintained on a substantial scale. (emphasis
added).
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Russian coast, 1 1893.
In this case, the Russian Government issued a decree prohibiting
exploitation of endangered seals, in water areas contiguous to its coast, by
British and American fishers. Reference can also be made to the case of
United Kingdom vs. Iceland,5 2 1960, and the Torrey Canyon incident.
. Lastly, although the state of necessity provides an opportunity for
coastal statesM to protect their essential interests by means other than those
expressly provided for in international law, in practice its use is fraught
with controversy. To ensure orderly relations in the exploitation of high seas
living resources, the current international fisheries management regime will

See Proclamation No. 2668, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,304 (1945), reprinted in WILuAM. W. BISHOP,

JR.,

INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 537 (2d. ed. 1962).

51. The government of Russia emphasized two points of particular relevance to this
study: it stated clearly that the action was a provisional measure, and that it was taken
because of "absolute necessity" to prevent extermination of seals. See U.N. Doc. of the 32nd
Session, [19801 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 27, A/CN.4/SE.A/1980/Add.1 (pt. 1). For a summary
of the negotiated agreement, see GOVERNMENT PRINTING BUREAU, OrrAWA, U.K. GOVERNMENT
REPORT OF THE BRITISH AGENT (ROBERT VENNING): PROVISIONAL AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO
BETWEEN HER MAJESTY'S GOvERNMENT AND THAT OF RUSSIA FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE SEAL
FISHERY DURING 1893 (1894).

52. In this case the British government failed to persuade the International Court that
the unilateral declaration of a 200-mile territorial sea by the government of Iceland, to
protect imperiled stocks of cod fish, was prejudicial and in breach of relevant international
law respecting the freedom of the high seas. The I.C.J's decision on the validity of Iceland's
claims to extended fisheries jurisdiction was significant for the following reasons:
recognition of the right of a coastal state to extended fisheries jurisdiction beyond the
territorial sea, for the purpose of conservation; nevertheless, the rights of the coastal state
would be 'preferential'; in other words, the coastal state could not oust the rights of other
distant water nations to resources; competing traditional rights of foreign nations would be
taken into account in the allocation of catches and granting of access rights to fisheries. See
Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Ice.), 1972 I.C.J. 12 (Interim Protection Order of
Aug. 17).
53. This incident involved the British decision to bomb the wreckage of a Liberian
tanker that had gone aground, spilling oil and polluting the water areas off the coast of
England. The following points were stated by the UK Government as justification for the
bombing: Torrey Canyon had gone aground and was apparently abandoned by the
shipowner; about 30,000 tons of oil had split into the sea off Cornwall, constituting a grave
danger to living marine resources; after the vessel broke into pieces, all efforts at dispersing
the oil which began to spread over the surface of the sea proved impossible; the threat to
marine resources was safeguardable only by bombing in order to burn up the oil remaining
on board the wrecked vessel. On this case, see White Paper issued by the British
Government: The Torrey Canyon, Cmnd. 3246 (London, H.M. Stationary Office, 1967).
54. The precedents cited are largely contemporary ones, suggesting also the newness
of global environmental consciousness and the idea that protecting world ecological balance
(the global village) is an essential interest of humankind. Nevertheless, the reality of a
growing competition over scarce resources, coupled with self-evident weaknesses in certain
aspects of international law, means that the concept of "necessity" will be put to use more
frequently in the future.
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have to be further strengthened with clearly defined mechanisms for the
allocation of allowable catches, and strict enforcement measures including
effective monitoring, control, and surveillance system. These are the
essential elements driving the initiative towards international acceptance of
a binding convention on straddling fish stocks.

55. The United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory
Fish Stocks has produced a binding convention for high seas fisheries, which emphasizes
effective conservation and enforcement measures. See Agreement for the Implementation of the
Provisionsof the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating
to the Conservationand Managementof Straddling Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 6th
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.164/37 (1995). On the implications of this agreement for the future
conservation of marine living resources see, Carlyle L. Mitchell, FisheriesManagement in the
GrandBanks, 1980-1992 and the StraddlingStocks Issue, 21 MARINE POL'Y, 97, 98- 109 (1997);
David A. Balton, Strengtheningthe Law of the Sea: The New Agreement on Straddling Stocks and
Highly Migratory Stocks, 27 OCEAN DEV. & INT'l. L. 125, 126-51 (1996); Julie R. Mack,
InternationalFisheriesManagement: How the U.N. Conference on Straddlingand Highly Migratory
FishStocks Changes the Law of Fishingon the High Sea, 26 CAL. W. INTL L.J. 313,314-32 (1996).

